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The fashion and apparel industry worldwide has undergone significant changes and a new 
business model has emerged – Specialty store retailer of Private label Apparel (SPA), 
also known simply as “fast fashion”. The demand for fast fashion is clearly confirmed by 
the annual reports of SPAs and Zara seems to be the most successful among all of them. 
Zara and its competitiveness has been one of the hot subjects both in academia and 
business circles, but none of the existing studies seems to offer a fully comprehensive 
analysis. This study fully investigates Zara’s sources of competitive advantage, 
organizing the existing data in a logical and cohesive way. A new, over-arching 
framework based on Porter’s (1990) diamond model and Moon’s (2012) ABCD 
framework of K-strategy is introduced and applied to explain Zara’s competitiveness. It is 
both unique and valuable, as it is combining the established and emerging theories into 
one analytical tool. In addition, this study also explores the potential impact of FTAs and 




significant for Zara’s internationalization and expansion, they remain highly unused and 
do not affect in any visible way Zara’s sourcing decisions. 
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1.1. Introduction to the Study 
 
The fashion and apparel industry worldwide has undergone significant changes, 
especially over the past quarter century. Changing consumption patterns, globalization of 
production and sales, as well as modified structural characteristics of the supply chain 
have resulted in an increasingly dynamic and demanding market. Intensified global 
competition, and complex trade mechanisms like those within the WTO (World Trade 
Organization), and FTAs (Free Trade Agreements) in the current fashion market are 
important factors encouraging continuous innovation and change among fashion 
companies. Successful companies reduced the time gap between designing and 
consumption on a seasonal basis, giving birth to the so-called “fast fashion” (Bhardwaj 
and Fairhurst 2010). A new business model emerged in the fashion industry – Specialty 
store retailer of Private label Apparel (SPA).  
The ‘fast fashion’ concept is similar to the one of quick response, and has been defined as 
a business strategy that aims to shrink the processes involved in the buying cycle and lead 
times for getting new fashion products into the stores, so as to satisfy consumer demand 
at its peak (Barnes and Lea-Greenwood 2006). Moreover, fast-fashion retailers aim to 
achieve a much higher turnover than traditional competitors. In order to do so, part of the 
fast-fashion business concept is to actually “create the demand” – SPAs create many more 




sold, it is replaced with a new one instead of more of the originally sold out product. This 
creates a sense of scarcity and urgency in the customers, encouraging them to buy more 
often and more impulsively (Bhardwaj et al. 2011). 
The demand for fast fashion is clearly confirmed by the annual reports of SPAs. The top 
four competitors in the global arena include Gap, Hennes & Mauritz’ (H&M), Uniqlo and 
Zara. The last one has perhaps mastered fast fashion better than any other, and is 
considered a pioneer in the field. Indeed by 2008 Inditex, Zara’s parent company, had 
become recognized as the world’s largest fashion retailer. It has maintained the position, 
significantly outperforming the competitors, with net sales of 18,117 million Euros in 
2014, compared to 16,429 million by H&M, 14,595 million by GAP and 9,951 million by 
Uniqlo (based on exchange rates from http://finance.yahoo.com/ on June 13
th
, 2015).  
Many respected specialists from business and academia have marveled at Zara’s 
incredible performance. Some of them took up the challenge to explain the phenomenon, 
and an abundance of articles and papers have been devoted to analyzing Zara’s 
competitiveness, strategies and business model (Ghemawat and Nueno 2006; Sull and 
Turconi 2008; Ferdows et al. 2004; Corsi et al. 2010; New York Times 2012).  However, 
most of those were focused on a particular aspect, like supply chain management (Kumar 
and Linguri 2006) or modes of internationalization (Fan and Lopez 2008). However, if a 
report is only focused on one or two criteria and lacks balance, it is very likely that the 
evaluation will be biased, overestimating or underestimating the competitiveness of a 




Against this backdrop, this study aims to investigate fully Zara’s sources of competitive 
advantage. By conducting this study, the author brings to the reader’s understanding how 
Zara’s chosen strategic business activities have contributed to its continuous growth and 
sustainable competitive advantage over the years. In addition, this study also explores the 
potential impact of FTAs and other trade solutions on Zara’s activities, since the subject 
remains untouched in the existing literature. 
Conducted as a qualitative case study research, this study further aims to introduce a new 
analytical model, which will serve as a comprehensive tool for understanding 
competitiveness. Therefore this study expands the understanding of Zara’s competitive 
advantage sources, as well as contributing to the literature and research on 
competitiveness in general. Zara has been found suitable as a case study for the present 
research because it is perhaps the world’s most successful clothing chain (New York Times 
2012). Hence the outcome that derives from Zara’s competitive advantages as a result of 
this investigation may be used as a basis for future studies with regards to 
competitiveness, especially concerning other fashion brands, but also on an extended 
industry-, and nation-level.  
What follows are the aims and objectives, research questions, and methodology that will 






1.2. Research Aims, Objectives and Questions 
 
The fundamental objective of this thesis, as previously set out, is to draw a clear 
understanding of Zara’s success and the way it has achieved sustainable competitive 
advantage over the years. In other words, this study tries to determine all the competitive 
advantage sources, and organize the results using a systemic framework, assuring the 
comprehensiveness and coherence of the research. This main objective will be achieved 
with a review of existing studies on Zara and competitiveness, and applying a new 
organizing framework to organize the sources of competitive advantage.  
Against the background of outlined objectives, certain questions arise which serve to 
forge an investigative framework and analytical benchmark for the present study. 
Consequently, the following questions are relevant for the purpose of this study: 
1. What are the business activities and sources of competitive advantage of Zara? 
2. How to conduct a comprehensive and systemic analysis of competitiveness? 







1.3. Research Methodology 
 
Having laid down the background and objectives for the research in the previous section, 
the aim of here is to discuss the adopted methodology for this study, as well as the data 
collection methods and approach. Given the multifaceted nature of research methods and 
design in literature the following explanation will justify the suitability of the adopted 
techniques to this study context.  
There are two general methods in research: qualitative and quantitative methods. The 
quantitative method can be described as a statistical or scientific evaluation process. This 
method is therefore recommended for research which aims to examine a predefined 
hypothesis, or where evidence can be tested with numerical procedures. The qualitative 
method on the other hand is more suitable for in-depth understanding of a given 
phenomenon or event. It tends to start with a specific observation and then builds towards 
general patterns (Saunders et al. 2007). 
The quantitative approach in business often over-emphasizes certain numerical values, 
notably financial indicators, and tends to mislay crucial facts arising from unquantifiable 
facets of individuals or the studied setting. Therefore it seems unsuitable for this study 
context, which requires an approach which refuses to reduce human behavior to 
numerical understanding and statistics, and instead allows an inductive and constructive 
interpretation of human and social interactions. Given this, the present study is built 
largely on the qualitative approach, as it enables a comprehensive and robust 




There are numerous strategies that can be employed in qualitative research. The case 
study approach is deemed the most suitable as a strategy for this research, as it is 
particularly valuable when seeking to explore a given phenomenon within certain 
contexts. A study of business realities is crucial to bridge the distance between university 
studies and the business world (Mazaria et al. 2003). This paper reflects this intention and 
uses the case study method to achieve it. The author agrees with the literature (Hartley 
1994; Yin 2013) on its validity as a research strategy and a principally best technique to 
understand any phenomenon in its natural setting.  
There are two techniques available to researchers for data collection; that is primary and 
secondary techniques. Primary data refers to materials obtained explicitly for a given 
research, while secondary data means materials which are publicly obtainable or prepared 
for other purposes (Saunders et al. 2007). For the purpose of this study mainly secondary 
techniques will be applied, as it provides crucial details and a variety of perspectives, 
while effectively supporting the research. Although it is deemed sufficient to conduct the 
research; alas it is not without limitations. Particularly in the fast changing fashion 
environment, secondary data can easily become outdated and it might be somewhat 
inadequate as to holistically and comprehensively study the phenomenon in its present 
state. However, these stated problems do not undermine the validity of this research, but 
rather draw on the importance of further studies.  
A new analytical framework based on Porter’s (1990) diamond model and Moon’s (2012) 




that an overarching framework like this could add significantly to research on competitive 
advantage and its sources. This has been suggested by Moon (2015), but remains to be 
largely employed in the literature. A more detailed explanation of the approach will 






1.4. Research Outline 
 
The following section will outline the sequence and fashion in which the author aims to 
carry out the study. In order to achieve logical flow and coherence, which allows us to 
identify the main points in the most concise manner, this study is divided into five 
different chapters as follows: 
1. Introduction 
2. Literature Review 
3. Zara Case Study 
4. New Framework 
5. Conclusions 
Chapter one is the introduction, which gives a brief background to the research subject, as 
well as defining the aims, objectives and research questions, which will guide the rest of 
the chapters. A detailed explanation on the chosen methodologies and justification of the 
choice is also included. Following this is Chapter two, which presents a review of current 
literature. It takes a thorough look at the theoretical literature related to competitiveness, 
with a detailed focus on the two selected frameworks, namely the diamond model (Porter 
1990) and the ABCD framework (Moon 2012). In addition, this chapter includes a review 
and criticism of the existing studies on Zara, which will serve as a base for the following 




characteristics and activities, identifying all its potential sources of competitive advantage. 
It consists of a general background, comparison with the main competitors, development 
over the years and current best practices. This chapter is followed by the fourth, where the 
data and descriptive study is organized and analyzed. Chapter four introduces a new 
analytical approach, combining the Diamond and ABCD framework to create an 
overarching model. The framework is applied in order to organize and systematize the 
analysis of Zara’s competitive advantages and present a full and clear picture. The final 
part is Chapter five, Conclusions, where the main outcomes of the research were 
evaluated and reviewed. The implications and limitations of the research are considered, 






2. Literature Review 
2.1. Existing Studies on Zara: Review and Criticism 
 
Many articles in both the academic and business press have been dedicated to Zara’s 
success story. Most of them find the main source of competitive advantage in the supply 
chain management, vertical integration or fast responsiveness. Some are quite 
comprehensive, although most focus on selective aspects. None of the existing studies 
seems to cover all of the important factors, and although many offer important and 
valuable insights, the overall analysis in each can be deemed incomplete. The following 
table presents a list of most prominent reports and their main arguments.  
<Table 1> Review of main arguments in the existing studies on Zara 
Study Arguments 
Ghemawat and Nueno 
(2006) 
- Standardized reporting systems 
- Investment in logistics and IT 
- Short production cycle, exploiting quick response 
capabilities and learning by doing 
- Minimal marketing but prime locations 
- Incentivized system for employees 
New York Times (2012) - Higher labor costs offset by greater flexibility and faster 
turnaround speed 
- Marketing through prime locations (high street) 
- Detecting global trends and copying already popular 
designs – speed of response 




Kumar and Linguri (2006) - Approach to the supply chain: “basic” items in low-cost 
manufacturing locations; fashion-dependent items made 
close to home; quick responsiveness. 
- Brand management: almost no-marketing, prestigious 
locations, simple IT – low costs in IT 
 
Ferdows, Lewis and 
Machuca (2004) 
- Supply chain – three principles: “Close the communication 
loop. Stick to a rhythm across the entire chain. Leverage 
your capital assets to increase supply chain flexibility.” 
Corsi, , Dessain and Ton 
(2010)  
- Approach to stores management: fast turnover, regular 
deliveries, incentivized and retained staff 
Lopez and Fan (2009) - Climate of scarcity and opportunity 
- Market-based pricing 
- Internationalization 
Avedano, Gonzalez and  
Mazaria (2003) 
- Market orientation approach 
 
Crofton and Dopico 
(2007) 
- Vertical integration 
- Speed: fast responsiveness and shorter product cycle 
- Investment in logistics and human resources 
 
As clearly presented in the table above, many researchers sought to define the sources of 






2.2. Conceptualization of Competitiveness and Competitive 
Advantage 
 
Competitive advantage and its sources have long been one of the central areas of research 
in the field of strategic management and business (Porter 1985; Barney 1991; Petraf 
1993). Two main approaches dominate the literature, namely the resource based view 
(Wernerfelt 1984; Barney 1991; Peteraf 1993), and the industry based view (Porter 1980, 
1985; Coutler and Robbins 2009). There is little doubt that these two types of analysis 
have been very fruitful in clarifying our understanding of the link between performance 
and, respectively, internal characteristics or external circumstances of a firm. They are 
also useful in explaining how managers can create sustainable competitive advantage 
(Barney 1991, Coutler and Robbins 2009). However, they do not seem to be quite 
sufficient when dealing with the complicated phenomenon of competitiveness, especially 
on the international scale. An analysis focusing on one of the two approaches may also be 
biased and overestimate or underestimate the competitiveness of a firm (Moon and Lee 
2004).  
Michael Porter is recognized as an almost unquestioned authority in the field of strategic 
management (Moon 2010). While most of the existing theories were related just to the 
competitiveness of a product or a firm, he asked why firms based in certain nations 
become internationally successful in particular industries. He therefore introduced the 
diamond model – an analytical framework composed of four internal determinants (factor 




plus two external variables (government and chance) (Porter 1990). The main four 
determinants can be perceived as a refined version of the variables included in his five-
forces model (Porter 1980, 1985, 1990).  
Essentially the diamond answers a “what” question, pointing what aspects firms must 
consider when designing strategy. It does not however give detailed suggestions on how 
to actually tackle the issues and successfully achieve competitive advantage. In the 
dynamic environment of global business these days it is becoming more and more 
important, to define “how” companies achieve competiveness. When everybody has 
access to the same resources what makes some firm excel over the others. The K-strategy 
ABCD model developed by Moon (2012) helps satisfy this new demand for a different 
analytical approach. Based on the in-depth study of the Korean economic success, it 
addresses the “how” question – how should companies operate in order to achieve 
competitive advantage. This makes it a very useful set of guidelines for managers, as well 
an important tool for analyzing competitiveness in the modern business environment. The 





2.3. The Diamond Model 
 
The diamond model was first introduced by Michael Porter in 1990, in order to explain 
why certain companies in certain nations are able to consistently innovate. Porter 
discarded the established theories of economists like Adam Smith and Ricardo as 
misguided, and claimed that the competitiveness of a nation is created rather than 
inherited. He originally identified four inter-related attributes determining the national 
competitive advantage. The first one is factor conditions, including labor force, capital 
and other physical resources (basic conditions), as well as the physical and knowledge 
infrastructure (advanced factor conditions). Porter emphasizes that disadvantages in the 
basic conditions can serve as a push factor for creating the advanced factor conditions. 
The second one, demand conditions, refers to the nature of domestic buyers, the size and 
sophistication of home demand. The third category is the role of related and supporting 
industries in promoting competitiveness through coordination and sharing activities in the 
value chain. The fourth one - firm strategy, structure, and rivalry - describes how 









<Figure 1> The Diamond of National Competitiveness 
 
Source: Porter (1990) 
Together with the production factor conditions that most traditional theorists employ to 
explain national competitiveness, Porter’s model systematically takes into consideration 
many more crucial variables and incorporates them into a single framework. It is 
therefore much more comprehensive than previously existing models and has 
considerably more explanatory power.  
Much research related to competitiveness has applied the diamond model and its 
extended versions (Narula 1993; Moon, Rugman and Verbeke 1998; Moon 2005). Indeed, 
despite the far-reaching explanatory power of Porter’s model, it is not free of flaws. 




economies, it is much less applicable to smaller or developing ones, and is quite limited 
when applied to global business. The model can be perceived as incomplete because it 
does not incorporate multinational activities (Dunning, 1992; Moon et al. 1998, Moon 
2010). In order to address the weaknesses the original single-diamond model has been 
extended to the double diamond model and other models, to explain the multidimensional 
nature of global business. Dunning (1992) suggested that multinational activities should 
be added to Porter’s model as a third exogenous variable. But in the modern global 
business environment multinational activities have become too significant to be treated 
just as an exogenous variable. Rugman and D’Cruz (1993) introduced the concept of 
double diamond model, suggesting that managers build upon both domestic and foreign 
diamonds to become globally competitive in terms of survival, profitability, and growth. 
The framework has been further polished and adapted by Moon, Rungman and Verbeke 










<Figure 2> The generalized double diamond. 
. 
Source: Moon et al. (1998) 
The main difference between the single diamond model (Porter, 1990) and the 
generalized double diamond model (Moon et al. 1995) is that the second one successfully 
incorporated multinational activities into the framework. When analyzing smaller 
economies, the generalized double diamond model offers a much more accurate and 
comprehensive analysis. 
In spite of these limitations, the single diamond model for competitiveness is still a useful 
analytical framework, which systematically organizes competitiveness into four 
categories (Moon 2010). It is important to note that the effect of one determinant is 




the diamond as a system – affects essential ingredients for achieving international 
competitive success” (Porter  1990: 77). In order to develop and sustain a competitive 
advantage companies must build on the fundamentals of the four corners of the Diamond 
(Porter 1990).  
Lastly, it is important to note that although the model was originally introduced as “the 
diamond of national competitiveness” it can be applied to conduct analysis on many 
different levels. The broad character of the determinants allows multiple interpretations. 
Moreover, Porter himself noted that it is firms, not nations, that compete in international 
markets. Therefore, although the diamond was originally seemingly designed to describe 
a nation’s features, it can also be applied to assess competitiveness at a company level 




2.4. The K-strategy and ABCD framework 
 
Analysis of the Korean successful strategy lead to a determination of four key 
characteristics of competitive nations and companies (the ABCD), each subdivided into 
two mutually enforcing elements (Moon 2012). 
<Figure 3> ABCD of the K-strategy  
 
Source: Moon (2015) 
Although this framework, just like the Diamond model, was originally designed to 
describe factors at the national level, it seems even more applicable at the company level. 
Indeed as mentioned before, it is firms, not nations that compete in the international 




characteristics and competitiveness. 
Since the framework has been only recently introduced, the author has done background 
research on each of the four categories, to further support its validity with previous 
studies. 
The “A” stands for agility, composed of speed and precision. In today’s volatile markets 
and fast-changing environment, speed of reaction and learning is crucial for maintaining 
competitive advantage (Eisenhardt et al. 2000). But speed without precision can cause 
accidents and a high-level of defective products, creating extra costs for the company, and 
causing customers’ dissatisfaction. The loss of customers’ trust is difficult to make up for, 
which is why precision must go hand in hand with speed (Moon 2012). From the 
company’s perspective, “agility might therefore be defined as the ability of an 
organization to respond rapidly to changes in demand both in terms of volume and 
variety”, its characteristics are flexibility and market sensitivity (Christopher 2000:39). 
“B” stands for benchmarking, which originally meant imitation and global standard. 
However, as the word “imitation” tends to carry a heavy load of negative connotations, it 
was later adapted to “learning” (Moon 2015). Many companies (notably Samsung) have 
been criticized for plagiarism, but actually in most of the cases it is the fast-follower who 
becomes the winner, not the first mover. Research shows that over time innovators 
capture only 7% of the market for their product, and many successful companies 
considered pioneers in their field, like Apple or McDonald’s, have actually built their 




where the key to success lies – it’s not just about copying, but learning and improving – 
introducing new global standard. The success formula designed by Moon (2012:105) is 
triangle plus alpha equals square plus question mark: starting with the existing basis and 
adding something new to create a better solution, but always remaining aware of further 
space for innovation (Moon 2012). 
“C” stands for convergence, composed of mixing and synergy creation. Much research 
has been done on different aspects and effects of diversification (Teece 1982; Markides 
and Williamson 1996). One of the more popular questions concerns the link between 
diversification and performance, and specifically the effects of related diversification and 
unrelated diversification. There is however no unequivocal answer, as different research 
yielded results supporting both kinds (Chaterjee and Wernerfelt 1991). Mixing the 
offerings and activities can be a way of making up for lacking resources, which has been 
demonstrated, for example, by Samsung company, which originally produced sugar, then 
diversified through garments production, and eventually into the current portfolio 
including electronics and other businesses. Although these are seemingly completely 
unrelated, the perception changes when looking at the bigger picture (Moon 2012, Kim 
2015). The mixing is most effective when it leads to synergy creation. Poorly chosen 
“ingredients” can lead to failure, like in Sony’s case. However, when mixing different 
business areas leads to synergy creation it can become a source of new competitive 
advantages (Kim 2010; Moon 2012). Convergence is also about adjusting to the local 
tastes – mixing the best from home with the best of local (Moon 2012). Much research on 




practices should be tailored to the local conditions (Farrell 2004, Ghemawat 2005). 
“D” stands for dedication, including diligence and goal orientation. Porter said that 
“modern competition depends on productivity” (1998:78). Therefore, diligence can be 
seen as a necessary precondition to enhancing competitiveness. But diligence itself is 
insufficient, as many examples show that without a clear aim the effort might still be 











Armando Ortega, the founder of the world’s largest apparel retailer, Inditex, opened the 
first Zara store in 1975, in a small town of A Coruna in Spain (Corsi et al. 2010). This let 
him become a self-made billionaire, ranking no 4 on the Forbes list of the richest people 
in 2015 (no 3 in 2014). His company has been growing exponentially ever since the first 
opening, and in 2014 Inditex reported annual net sales of slightly over 18 billion euros 
(Inditex 2014). Since the late 1980s successive launches of new retail concepts followed, 
and currently Inditex holds eight different brands (Zara, Pull & Bear, Massimo Dutti, 
Bershka, Stradivarious, Oysho, Zara Home and Uterique). In spite of the holding group 
expansion, Zara remained the flagship of Intditex, with annual sales of almost 11.6 billion 
euros in 2013, nearing 2/3 of Inditex’s total. Currently present in 88 markets, more than 
any other of the eight brands, and with a total of 2085 stores (including the Zara Kids 
sub-concept), Zara is indeed the driving force of the holding company. Since 2010 Zara 
introduced online sales, which are currently available in 26 countries (Inditex 2014).  
Zara was the pioneer of the new business model in the fashion industry, which recently 
became recognized as Specialty store retailer of Private label Apparel (SPA). The SPA 
term refers to specified apparel retailers, who plan and manufacture their own product as 
they reflect the market trend and consumers` desire, as well as distribute and sell the 




successful companies to reduce the time gap between designing and consumption on a 
seasonal basis, giving birth to the so-called “fast fashion” (Bhardwaj and Fairhurst 2010). 
Although many other SPAs emerged over the past decades, ZARA clearly stands out as 
unique with its “no-marketing” strategy and “close-to-home” production approach. Many 
have doubted that the home-based central logistics system can be sustained as the 
company expands globally, but so far Zara maintains all of its logistics in Spain. Although 
nearly half of its offerings are now produced in different, more remote locations, all of its 
goods, even the ones produced in Asia, go through the Spanish distribution centers before 
being sent back to the Asian stores (Crofton and Dopico 2007). In spite of that Zara brags 
an impressive delivery time of two to 48 hours to any store or online customer. (Inditex 
2014). Figure 3 shows how the model works, with the dot located approximately in the 
center of the map representing the logistics centers in Spain, and the arrows showing how 










Figure <3> Zara Business Model: Centralized Logistics for All Locations 
  
 
Source: Inditex (2014) 
Zara’s exponential growth has attracted attention in both business and academia. Its case 
has received plenty of coverage in both popular media and research papers, as many have 
tried to discover the ultimate secret behind its success (Hansen 2012; Ferdows et al. 2004; 
Mazaria et al. 2003; Lopez and Fan 2009; Corsi et al. 2010). As the table in the previous 
chapter indicates, the existing research lacks a systemic organizing framework, and seems 
unable to account for all the factors which contribute to Zara’s competitive advantage. 
What follows is an in-depth case study, placing Zara in context with its competitors and 
accounting for the 40 years of development. The next chapter will introduce a new 





3.2. Competitors and Performance 
 
Zara and Inditex attracted a lot of attention in both business and academia because of 
their exponential growth and incredible performance. Currently Zara has three main 
competitors, two of which have been battling on the fashion arena a little longer than 
Inditex, and one recent entrant catching up fast: H&M, Gap and Uniqlo (Forbes 2015).  
H&M is the oldest among the five competitors, being established in 1947 in Sweden, and 
is considered the most direct and aggressive competitor to Zara. Zara sales overcame 
H&M in 2005, but last year, for the first time since then, H&M has registered a higher 
growth in sales than Inditex (Guardian 2008). The gap in sales is also fairly narrow, 
encouraging speculation over which of the two fashion giants will triumph at the end of 
2015. In terms of global presence, however, Zara is still far ahead, with stores in 88 
markets compared to H&M’s 58. H&M is also much more focused on its main concept: 
the H&M brand. Although it holds 5 other brands, their locations all together account for 
less than 10 percent of all H&M group stores. On the other hand Zara constitutes nearly 
1/3 of Inditex locations, although it accounts for 2/3 of its sales.  
The second oldest competitor is American GAP Inc., founded in 1969. It previously held 
the title of largest fashion retailer, but it was overtaken by Zara in 2008 (Guardian 2008). 
Gap Inc. includes five brands, and while GAP is the largest one, it is less dominating than 
the H&M concept for H&M group, or even Zara for Inditex. The Gap group has been 




amount of sales, its growth is marginal at only 1.7% in 2014, and it has been falling 
further and further behind the other two. 
On the other hand a new entrant – Fast Retailing, with its flagship brand Uniqlo, emerged 
from Japan in 1984, and has been catching up fast. Fast Retailing has been growing at an 
extreme pace, and by 2015 holds six other concepts. However, Uniqlo still constitutes 
more than a half of its locations. It has also been developing aggressively abroad, with its 
first foreign store opening only 4 years after founding. Currently it operates stores in 16 
different markets, with plans to enter more every year.  
<Table 2> Zara (Inditex) and Competitor Data 
 
Company Net Sales 
2014 (mln. 
Euros) 
Net sales growth 





Zara (Inditex) 18 117 8% 2 085 
(6 460) 
88 
H&M 16 429 18% 3 261 
(3 600) 
58 









Source: Author’s compilation based on Financial Reports for 2013 and 2014 
Table 2 presents a comparison of Zara and its main competitors. Although last year H&M 
and Uniqlo registered higher sales growth, Zara still dominates the industry with the 




3.3. Current Best Practices and Strategies 
 
As the pioneer of “fast fashion” Zara has become famous for agility across all of its 
activities in the value chain. There is always material or fabric held in ‘greige’ i.e. undyed 
and unprinted, to speed up the manufacturing process in response to excessive demand of 
a particular product or a new trend. (Christopher 2000). Zara also owns two enormous, 
automatized logistics centers. They are linked with factories by underground tunnels, and 
permit fast and precise distribution of products. It is important to remark that it’s not just 
speed of delivery that matters, but also its accuracy, and Zara claims an outstanding 
98.9 % accuracy of shipments (Kumar and Linguri 2006).   
Zara refined the manufacturing process by introducing the sophisticated just-in-time 
systems, developed in cooperation with Toyota, which allowed the company to customize 
its processes and exploit innovations. It enabled establishment of a business model that 
allows self-containment throughout the stages of materials, manufacture, product 
completion, and distribution to stores worldwide within just a few days (Kensuke 2011; 
Crofton and Dopico 2007). Zara has also invested heavily in real estate and owns most of 
its stores. It effectively benchmarked world-famous brands, like Louis Vuitton, Chanel, 
Gucci or Prada and managed to secure many locations in the exact same area (Hansen 
2012). Stores in prime locations like 5
th
 Avenue in New York, Oxford Street in London, or 
Nanjing Road in Shanghai at first sight do not differ much from the luxurious brands 
surrounding them (Inditex 2014). Flagships stores are the pride and beating heart of Zara, 




Human resources are also crucial to Zara’s success. A large team of carefully selected 
designers is learning the latest trends from catwalks and other fashion hotspots and then 
adapts them for the mass market, creating a new global standard. (Kumar and Linguri 
2006). But human resources management does not end at selecting the right people. Zara 
has been successfully mixing its staff to create synergistic effects. Cross-functional teams, 
where designers work together with commercial and retail specialists, are the driving 
force behind the creation and choice of most optimal and successful designs (Christopher 
2000). In order to avoid the pitfalls of team-based systems, like indecisiveness and 
stagnation, team members often switch teams. This brings in a wave of fresh ideas to the 
group as well as keeping the employees motivated (Kumar and Linguri 2006). Zara is 
always looking for people with ideas, employees at all levels receive considerable 
autonomy, allowing them to contribute ideas for improvement. The key point is that none 
of the stores retain a good solution for themselves, the ideas which turn out successful 
will be immediately shared and implemented in other points as well (Corsi et al. 2010). 
And that’s why Zara is truly dedicated to finding and nourishing talents - 90% of store 
managers are promoted from within. They undergo comprehensive training programs. 
‘Commercials’ managing the product flow receive an annual bonus based on sales in the 
stores for which they are responsible. Regional managers, called DTs are also evaluated 
based on how well the stores under their wings perform, and their annual bonus is based 
not just on sales, but also labor productivity and team motivation. Each store has clearly 
set targets; the salaries of section managers depends on how well those targets are 




Dedication must be a top priority of Zara’s strategy with regard to human resources. 
Experienced and committed employees are necessary to sustain the business model, 
making low turnover crucial. Zara achieves it by generally offering higher starting wages 
than those in other retail stores, and all store employees, including the part-timers also 
receive a commission. This incites both their diligence and goal orientation. Furthermore, 
sales associates are organized by section (women’s, men’s and children’s) and managers 
make an effort to match the associates with the right section and collection, having faster 
employees working with basic line -department where most folding has to be done; and 
younger ones working with TRF - Zara female teenager line (Corsi et al.. 2010). Store 
managers are very independent and hold the sole responsibility for deciding which styles 
to offer, and what should come with each of the orders made twice a week. Their pay 
depends on the accuracy of their sales forecasts, sales growth, and goals realization. 
Country managers constantly remain in touch with the store managers and visit each 
location at least twice per year to provide feedback and assure that stores remain on track 
with the Zara vision (Sull and Turconi 2008).  
As the section above shows, Zara invests a lot in people. But its commitments do not end 
there – it is equally dedicated to investment in capital. It has more than 20 fully owned, 
specialized factories, which allows it to maintain closer control over production. They 
have been highly automatized and can operate extra hours, should unforeseen demand 
arise. In case sudden demand surges, part time workers are also employed to assure 




time zones, so as to guarantee timely and precise deliveries to locations all around the 
world (Ferdows et al. 2004).  
The very core of Zara’s competitive strategy is to be a “quick fashion follower” 
(Ghemawat and Nueno 2006). In order to make sense of the rapidly changing 
environment under pressure, Zara has developed a highly advanced ‘shared situation 
awareness’ – a team’s ability to recognize a pattern in a fluid situation and use it to 
anticipate what will happen next (Sull and Turconi 2008). Zara has introduced 
standardized reporting systems and product information management to achieve it. The 
supply chain is organized to transfer both hard data and anecdotal information quickly 
and easily from shoppers to designers and production staff. It is also set up to track 
materials and products in real time every step of the way, including inventory on display 
in stores. Each of the section managers is equipped with a customized handheld computer 
(PDA), which support the connection between stores and headquarters. They serve to 
transfer both hard data, like orders and sales, as well as qualitative intel such as customer 
reactions. Such communications can often be impaired by bureaucratic cracks, but Zara’s 
flat organization effectively prevents it. Its operational procedures, performance measures 
and even office layouts ae all designed so as to make information transfer easy (Ferdows 
et al. 2004).  
Furthermore, Zara is following the “learning by doing” strategy. It allows retailers to 
change up to 50% of their orders after the season starts, while the industry average is 




production takes place, so that it is possible to adjust the goods or even cancel some 
depending on customer reactions. Thanks to that Zara has only 1% failure rates on new 
products (Ghemawat et al. 2006). The approach to designing is also a crucial element of 
the strategy. While its designs are highly ‘inspired’ by those seen on catwalks or luxury 
store shelves, Zara always makes sure to change them “just enough to avoid copyright 
laws” (New York Times 2012: 7). Thanks to an effective benchmarking strategy it has 
never lost a case for copyright infringement, although it has been sued.  
In Zara the “customer is always determining production” (New York Times 2012: .4). 85% 
of the in-house production takes place after the season has started (whereas the industry 
average is 20%). This allows a quick response to customer reactions and assuring supply 
is dictated by demand, faster than in any other company (Ghemawat and Nueno 2006). 
Many have marveled at Zara’s agility with regard to demand, like when in 2006 the film 
“Marie Antoinette” became a blockbuster, Zara had puffy ball gowns and velvet jackets in 
stores before it was even off the screens, and far faster than any of its competitors. The 
company structures enhance communication, and data analysis permits fast trend-spotting 
and swift response (Sull and Turconi 2008).  Always maintaining extra capacity is also 
crucial for creating quick-response capabilities (Ghemawat and Nueno 2006). 
Next to the “fast fashion” tag, “vertical integration” seems to be the number two 
expression that comes to mind when bringing up Zara. Indeed, it is very well-known for 
its broad range of activities. Zara successfully creates synergistic effects by combining 




fashion firms, it combines not only design and sales, but also production. Vertically 
integrating different stages of production allows the company to be more responsive to 
changing trends and surges in demand as well as maintain higher control over the process 
and quality (Crofton and Dopico 2007). At the same time Zara mixes internal production 
with outsourcing certain activities to achieve the best results. Capital-intensive 
operations, which enhance cost-efficiency through economies of scale are conducted 
internally, while the simple, labor-intensive operations are subcontracted (Ferdows et al. 
2004).  
Flexibility guides Zara not just in design, production and sales, but also with regards to 
new market entries. Although Zara generally prefers the fully-owned subsidiaries model, 
joint ventures are chosen for markets with serious administrative barriers to foreign 
companies, and franchises are selected for high-risk countries which are culturally distant 
or have small markets with low-sales forecasts. Whichever model is selected, Zara 
follows the pattern of expansion known as “oil stain” – open its first store in a strategic 
area to gather information about the market and acquire expertise, which then guides Zara 
in the following stages of expansion in that country (Lopez and Fan 2008). 
In order to succeed with the model, Zara is making sure that its offerings are always 
corresponding to the existing demand. This is mainly achieved by gathering design 
inspirations not just from fashion shows, but also competition stores, movies, campuses 
etc. In other words, Zara is simply learning and upgrading the designs already popular 




by opinion leaders, and visit popular clubs and cafes to predict what innovations from 
other designers their customers may desire (Crofton and Dopico 2007). The offerings are 
adjusted to physical and cultural differences between the markets, and prepared so as to 
satisfy the demand in all off the countries where it is present, but no-single country 
designs are created. It succeeds in creating more universal designs based on a mixture of 
what is best from many countries (Ghemawat and Nueno 2006). Analyzing the 
information from many markets together allows the designers to identify the truly global 
trends. Comparing feedback from different locations enhances their capability to spot the 
trends as they emerge and respond quickly by creating designs that can be equally 
successful in all of its locations (New York Times 2012; Lopez and Fan 2009). 
Zara’s business model is sometimes referred to as “democratization of fashion” – 
delivering creative and quality design responding rapidly to customer demands at 
reasonable prices (Crofton and Dopico 2007). This goal is visible in Zara’s quite unique 
pricing strategy. Rather than using the traditional cost plus margin pricing system 
commonly used by the clothing industry, Zara uses a market-oriented target pricing 
system. One of the main tasks of the sales department is to identify the price consumers in 
a given country are willing to pay for a particular item, and the price of “like”-goods 
available in competition stores. This information is used as a basis to establish a target 
price for each article. This way the price is always maintained at the affordable level 
(Mazaria et al. 2003). Finally, Zara’s management tends to prefer undersupply to over-
stocking. Customers in Zara stores can find new articles with almost every visit, but they 




stimulates demand, while at the same time encouraging customers to visit stores more 
often - an estimated average of 17 times a year compared to industry average of four 
visits (Lopez and Fan 2009).  
Rapid response to market demands is Zara’s key objective, and all of its activities seem to 
be dominated by it. The deliveries are run by third-party logistics. With orders coming in 
twice a week by an unbreakable deadline, the trucks and air-freights run according to a 
fixed schedule – like a bus service. This allows the managers to predict exactly the time 
of delivery and prepare accordingly. Regular deliveries also serve as an incentive for 
customers who visit stores more often on those days. The shipments were already short in 
2004, with goods arriving to European stores by road within 24 hours, and by air to 
American ones in 48, Japanese ones 72 hours. Yet Zara pursues continued optimization, 
allowing further cuts of the delivery time to less than 24 hours for Europe and within 40 
hours for Asia and America (Fedrows et al. 2004; Corsi et al. 2010). According to Inditex 
presentation materials for results 2014, the orders arrive to all stores and online customers 
within two to 48 hours (Inditex 2014) thanks to the efficient and agile logistics 
subcontractors.  
Zara has also acquired the IT necessary to improve communications in the company. 
Along with many other successful retailers, notably Wall-mart, Zara employs smart but 
simple IT solutions to manage the highly automated distribution centers and even many 
parts of the production process (Ghemawat and Nueno 2006). But Zara is also careful to 




actually complicate the processes they were meant to simplify. There are no permanent 
electronic networks that would link the stores, headquarters, factories and distribution 
centers, yet the solutions in place are effectively getting the job done. Inditex spends only 
0.5% of revenues on IT, whereas the average for retailers in US is 2% (Crofton and 
Dopico 2007). Zara created its own global standard in terms of IT solutions – its 
managers use personal held devices called “Cassiopeia”, created specifically for placing 
orders and continuous collection of market information in the Inditex group (Mazaria et 
al. 2003). In 2010, Zara also followed other fashion retailers by opening e-commerce 
platforms (Inditex 2013).  
Zara sources fabrics and other inputs from external suppliers with the help of sourcing 
personnel at headquarters and two purchasing offices in Barcelona and Hong Kong. 
Conducting purchases from different strategic locations allows faster trend-spotting and 
increased efficiency in finding the best supply options (Ghemawat and Nueno 2006). 
Mixing raw materials from suppliers in different locations all around the world, including 
suppliers in Mauritius, Korea, Morocco, Italy, Germany and many more, Zara makes sure 
to get the best quality and price for every necessary fabric (Christopher 2000).  
Finally, one of Zara’s most distinctive characteristics is its promotion strategy. Doubtful 
of its effectiveness, Zara spends little on advertising. While its competitors like Gap and 
H&M spend respectively 5 and 4 percent of revenues on advertising, with the industry 
average of 3.5 percent, Zara invests spends 0.3 percent (Crofton and Dopico 2007). 




sales start or for the opening of a new store. Zara relies on the stores and award-winning 
displays as its main promotion tool (Lopez and Fan 2009). The stores serve as a venue for 
meeting customers and are considered the best advertising vehicle. Located in prime spots 
in major cities worldwide, they bring Zara’s fashion to the High Street and represent the 
true hallmark of the brand. Moreover, the store architecture seems to reflect Zara’s 
business philosophy, and is further tailored to the local needs of customers and the 
community (Inditex 2013).  
Zara’s care for the communities is visible not just with regard to its customers. Near the 
factories in Spain, Zara has a network of some 450 subcontractors. These are generally 
small workshops, with an average of 20-30 people (although exceptions employing more 
than a 100 can also be found), and they are grouped by product type. As subcontractors, 
they usually have long-term relations with Zara, who account for most or even all of their 
production, and provide them with technology logistics and financial support. Zara also 
carries out onsite inspections and makes sure that they comply with local tax and labor 
legislation (Ghemawat and Nueno 2006). In 2000, cooperating with other Galician textile 
firms, Inditex launched the Institute of Technology and Textile Design in Allariz, Galicia, 
to produce highly-qualified experts in textiles (Crofton and Dopico 2007). This shows 






3.4. Extension: The Impact of RTAs on Zara’s Activities 
 
The WTO defines regional trade agreements (RTAs) as “reciprocal trade agreements 
between two or more partners” (WTO 2015). They include free trade agreements (FTAs) 
and customs unions. With regard to trade, the European Union is like an RTA, whose 
roots go back to 1957, when the European Economic Community (EEC) was created. In 
1968 it eliminated all quotas and tariffs from trade in goods within it. Further efforts were 
also taken to eliminate non-tariff barriers and in 1993 the single market became a reality 
(European Commission website 2015). Spain joined the European Union in 1986, the 
same year as Portugal. Zara began its internationalization in 1988, by opening a first store 
in Portugal. Joining the European Union seems to be one of the key pull factors 
explaining the decisions regarding internationalization. The enlargement of the EU in 
2004 is also considered to justify the considerable number of European markets that Zara 
entered that year (Lopez and Fan 2008). 
As of 7 April 2015, according to WTO records, 262 physical RTAs were in force (WTO 
2015). Considering the impact that joining the EU had on Zara’s internationalization, one 
could expect these factors to play an important role too. However, most of the agreements 
were completed in the 2000s, with many entering into force over the last decade, whereas 
Zara’s aggressive expansion abroad took place from 1997 to 2005. An important obstacle 
to evaluate the actual impact of FTAs on firms’ activities is also the complicated 
regulations with regards to rules of origin. Although Inditex remains committed to 




located near the Spanish headquarters, almost as much comes from suppliers spread all 
around the globe. 
<Table 3> Inditex Supply Chain in 2013  
Source: Inditex (2013) 
According to the U.S. Office of Textiles and Apparel (OTEXA), the FTAs “allow textile 
and apparel manufacturers to enter and compete more easily in the global marketplace” 
(ITA, 2015). Following this logic companies in the fashion industry should be making 
significant use of the agreements. However, research conducted in 2014 by Dr. Sheng Lu 
in collaboration with the United States Fashion Industry Association seems to indicate 
quite the opposite. The research confirmed that companies are diversifying their sourcing 
base, and the majority source from more than 6 countries, with many having suppliers in 
more than 20 different nations, just like Zara. Yet despite its diverse sourcing strategies, 
the utilization rate of most FTAs and preference programs is still very low. In the U.S., 
except for the four most-used FTAs and preference programs, namely the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade 




Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS), all the remaining enacted FTAs and preferences 
programs show utilization rates below 20%, and some are not used at all. Still, the 
industry representatives expressed interest and support for all future trade agreements 
intended to remove trade barriers and facilitate international trade agreements, especially 
the TPP and TPA (Sheng Lu 2014). Considering that many of the RTAs entered into force 
less than 10 years ago, it is valid to assume the patterns of sourcing are still adapting to 












In the previous section the author presented a comprehensive analysis of all Zara’s 
activities across the value chain, which might contribute to its competitive advantage 
against other competitors in the global market. Most of them have also been described in 
previous research, as indicated in chapter two of this study. However, it is important to 
note that none of the existing studies covered all of these aspects. Rather than that, they 
chose to focus on some particular characteristics, creating a more cohesive yet somewhat 
limited analysis. Combining all of the factors is necessary for a truly comprehensive and 
non-biased understanding of the Zara phenomenon. On the other hand, what emerges is a 
complicated picture and what might seem like an un-organized set of data. In order to 
improve the comprehension and make the study more approachable, an over-arching 





4.2. An Extended Framework: Integrated ABCD-Diamond of 
Competitive Advantage 
 
In order to conduct a thorough research regarding a firm’s competitiveness a 
comprehensive and balanced framework is necessary (Moon and Lee 2004). To the extent 
that Porter’s diamond model (1990) brings together firm-specific linkages between 
determinants, his model is useful and potentially predictive at the firm level and can serve 
as a basis for assessing firms’ competitiveness (Bark and Moon 2002; Moon and Lee 
2004; Markus 2008). Applying the diamond model offers valuable insights, but because 
each of its corners has a very broad character, it can often turn out insufficient to identify 
the actual sources of competitive advantage. For example, as factor conditions encompass 
both raw materials and human resources, simply identifying the factor conditions as a 
weak point does not clearly imply which of the factors are missing, or how to change the 
strategy with regard to this corner to improve it.  
Another weakness of the diamond analysis is that it focuses solely on the input factors, 
representing the “what” approach. It identifies determinants like superior technology, 
intensive competition at home, or cheaper labor, as sources of competitiveness. But the 
business play field is not a static environment; the circumstances constantly keep on 
changing (Elsenhardt and Martin 1985). Recent technology developments in terms of 
communications and transportation lead to massive globalization of business activities 
and development of global value chains.  This means that companies are more and more 




narrowing, it becomes more and more important to incorporate the “how” approach into 
the analysis. When many companies can dispose of similar resources, it is how they use 
them that defines winners and losers. 
The ABCD framework answers the “how” part of the question about competitive 
advantage sources. It focuses on the process factors rather than the input factors, offering 
a more dynamic view of the firms’ competitiveness. In the global business environment, 
where many companies have access to similar technologies as well as resources, the 
ABCD framework identifies “how” they should be used in order to create a sustainable 
competitive advantage (Moon 2015). It is therefore complementary to the diamond model 
“what” approach.  
Combining the two models into an extended framework allows a truly comprehensive 
approach, necessary to fully grasp the sources of competitive advantage for firms in the 
dynamic, global business environment nowadays. This has been suggested by Moon 
during numerous lectures in 2014 and 2015, but remains basically unemployed in the 
literature. The new model incorporates both the input factors and the process factors at an 








<Figure 4> ABCD-Diamond of Competitive Advantage  
 
(Source: Author’s compilation) 
Figure 4 presents the new framework, an extended ABCD-Diamond of competitive 
advantage. By applying the ABCD rules on each of the four diamond corners, a total of 
16 categories are created. Like the original diamond corners, they are all interconnected, 
and yet mutually exclusive. This allows a very detailed analysis, covering both the “what” 
and “how” aspects of firm’s activities and providing a more detailed and clear picture of 
the competitive advantage sources. This said, it also provides a way for the old and new 
approaches to meet in one comprehensive analysis. The integrated ABCD-Diamond 
model should prove very useful in identifying sources of competitive advantage at firm-, 
industry-, and national level. 
As chapter two of this study indicated, most of the existing studies on Zara have been 




sustainable competitiveness in the volatile markets nowadays. The following table uses 
the new ABCD-Diamond framework to show how each of them is lacking. 
<Table 4> Comparison of Research on Zara and the ABCD-Diamond Model 
(Source: Author’s compilation) 
 As indicated above, none of the existing studies fully covered all of Zara’s activities 
contributing to its competitiveness. Most of the research focused on some particular 
aspects, notably the factor conditions of the diamond model, or the agility factor of the 
ABCD framework. Moreover, none of the characteristics covered by the existing studies 
is omitted by the new model; each of them belongs to one of the 16 categories. The 
following section will present how this contributes to the overall understanding and 





4.3. New Framework at Work: Zara Case Study 
 
The previous section of this study introduced a new analytical framework. In chapter 
three the author described in detail various aspects of Zara’s activities, which contribute 
to its sustainable competitive advantage. However, as the emerging picture is both 
extremely rich and complicated, it might be difficult to actually comprehend where the 
advantage stems from. By applying the analytical framework, it is possible to organize all 
of the activities described into 16 categories defined by the model. Thus, the true 
explanation of Zara’s competitiveness lies in the ABCD-Diamond model. Zara has been 
able to consequently outperform its competitors by applying the ABCD guidelines on 
each of the diamond corners. It is also important to note, that although the four ABCD 
categories are further divided into sub-categories in the extended model, they are fully 
accounted for in the analysis. The following table shows how the data from chapter three 







<Table 5> Integrated ABCD-Diamond Model Analysis of Zara 
Factor 
conditions 
A Automatized distribution centers linked with factories by underground 
tunnels – 98.9 per cent accuracy of shipments; TPS just-in-time system; 
keeping material in “greige” next to factories  
B Copying the designs from catwalks and other fashion hotspots, but also 
adapting them to mass market – creating new global standard, locating stores 
similar to top luxury brands 
C Cross-functional teams – mixing designers with comercial and retail 
specialists, team members often switch 
D fully owned, specilized factories; distribution centers scheduled by time 
zones; temporary workers hired in case of demand surges; promoting 90% of 





A Standarized reporting systems and product information; shared situation 
awarness based on real-time raw hard data and qulitative intel from store 
managers; quick fahsion follower  
B Learning by doing – limited production at introduction stage; only 1% failure 
rates on new products; changing designs just enough to avoid copyright laws 
C Vertical Integration, capital-intensive production internal, labor-intensive 
and scale-insensitive activities subcontracted  
D Store managers decide which styles to offer, their pay depends on accuracy of 
sales forecasts, sales growth and goals realization; country menagers visit all 
subordinate stores every year  
Demand 
conditions 
A “Customer is always determining production”, 85% of the in-house 
production after the season has started (vs average 0-20%); maintains extra 
capacity – capability to respond quickly to demand 
B Copying the designs already popular among customers  
C Offerings adjusted to physical and cultural differences, but no single-country 
styles – creating universal designs based on mix of best from many countries   
D Careful choice of markets – goal oriented, enters only markets where it has 
the adventage with current business model, international prices adjusted to 




A Fixed delivery schedule, deliveries within 24h in Europe and 48h worldwide. 
B Advanced IT solutions and communication system to connect supply, 
production, HQ and sales points; opening national e-commerce platforms   
C Purchasing offices in Barcelona and Hong Kong – mixing sourcing from Far 
East and Europe  
D More than 300 specialized small subcontractors work exclusively for Inditex, 








This study has critically examined the factors that underlie the success of Zara and its 
superior performance with regard to other competitors in the market. Unsurprisingly, 
there are many interdependent factors which combined to allow Zara to create a unique 
value proposition for the customers and sustain a competitive advantage. The findings 
with regard to Zara’s competitiveness are in line with existing reports and studies, but 
have been extended and are more comprehensive than provided by the previous research. 
The analysis revealed how the existing research is lacking, and provided a comprehensive 
overview of the company and all of its competitive advantage sources. 
In order to organize the gathered data this study introduced a new over-arching 
framework for analyzing competitiveness. By combining the established and the 
emerging theories, a new ABCD-Diamond model is presented. Such an analytical 
approach has been suggested by Moon (2015), and the author’s contribution lies in 
polishing the model and applying it to explain Zara’s success. Indeed, all of Zara’s 
important activities that contribute to the sustainable competitive advantage can be 
classified into one of the 16 mutually exclusive yet interdependent categories. Therefore 
it can be concluded, that Zara’s competitiveness stems from applying the ABCD on each 
of the diamond corners.  
Organizing all of its activities in a fast and precise manner contributes considerably to 




allows the firm to avoid many pitfalls of the industry and create a new, hard to imitate 
global standard. Vertical integration of activities and convergence resulting from the 
approach helps further enhance its performance. Finally, dedication and goal orientation 
throughout Zara’s organizing manner and strategies strongly supports the business 
sustained growth and superior results. Moreover, it is crucial to note that this approach is 
eminent throughout the diamond model with regard to factor conditions; strategy, 
structure and rivalry; demand conditions and supporting industries. 
In the volatile global markets of 21
st
 century many companies competing in the same 
field can access similar resources, address the same demand group and can reach similar 
support industries. When the “what” factors no longer create a visible difference it is 
“how” companies approach them that defines supreme competitiveness.  At the same 
time, this is not to say that the four determinants of the diamond model are no longer 
applicable. Their mutually exclusive and interdependent character makes it necessary to 
maintain all of them in focus, and achieve a unique “how” with regard to each of them for 
highest performance. 
In order to address the issue above the author introduced a new model integrating the 
established “what” approach and the emerging “how” theories. The new model is based 
on two state-of-the-art frameworks, that is Porter’s diamond model (1990) and Moon’s 
ABCD framework (2012). This lead to an establishment of 16 interdependent and 
mutually exclusive categories, which can best serve the purpose of analyzing 




have to face. The model has been used to organize the data on Zara and explain its 
competitive advantage with regard to other competitors. The ABCD-diamond emerged as 
a useful and overarching framework, which could serve as an analytical tool for 
researchers and a guideline for managers. 
This study also extended the analysis to include the potential impact of RTAs on Zara’s 
activities. In spite of the expectations, it seems that so far the free trade agreements and 
other preferential trade solutions do not play a crucial part in the company’s sourcing 
decisions, although they seem to have had some impact with regard to the 
internationalization process. As the number of FTAs is constantly increasing, updating the 
research seems crucial as changes in the sourcing patterns are likely to emerge. 
Indeed this study has its own limitations, as well as defined scopes and objectives within 
which all it is constrained. Further studies can therefore look beyond the present 
limitations and explore more holistically both the fast fashion world and the phenomenon 
of competitiveness. For example this study referred to Zara’s main competitors only in 
terms of financial performance and global presence, but provides no comparison in terms 
of business activities, models and sources of competitive advantage. Therefore future 
studies can attempt to conduct a more comprehensive comparative analysis, in order to 
provide a clear understanding of their relative competitiveness. 
Furthermore, the newly introduced framework has only been presented at work in a single 
case study. To further prove its broad yet unique character more studies would be 




important contribution. Furthermore, expanding its applicability into the industry-level 
and national-level of analysis would serve as an important extension, considerably 
improving the academic field. 
Finally there is strong need to constantly update the research with regard to how free 
trade agreements affect some of the strategic choices and business activities, both 
concerning Zara and other companies. With dozens of new trade solutions introduced 
every year it is valid to expect their importance for companies to grow exponentially. 
More research in the field would definitely provide valuable insights.  
It seems fair to conclude that this research serves its purpose and contributes to the field 
of strategic management and studies on competitiveness, by providing a more 
comprehensive analysis of Zara than any of the existing studies, and organizing the 
available data in a unique and clear manner, which significantly increases the 
understanding of the Zara phenomenon. The author believes a further contribution also 
stems from introducing a new systemic model for analyzing competitiveness, which 
could serve as a useful tool for managers and academics. In this regard, ideas for further 
research are also provided in hopes of continuous improvement and enrichment of the 
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